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FINDING SAFE STRATEGIES
FOR COMPETITIVE DIFFUSION ON TREES
JEANNETTE JANSSEN AND CELESTE VAUTOUR
Abstract. We study the two-player safe game of Competitive Diffusion, a game-
theoretic model for the diffusion of technologies or influence through a social network.
In game theory, safe strategies are mixed strategies with a minimal expected gain
against unknown strategies of the opponents. Safe strategies for competitive diffusion
lead to maximum spread of influence in the presence of uncertainty about the other
players. We study the safe game on two specific classes of trees, spiders and complete
trees, and give tight bounds on the minimal expected gain. We then use these results
to give an algorithm which suggests a safe strategy for a player on any tree. We test
this algorithm on randomly generated trees, and show that it finds strategies that are
close to optimal.
1. Introduction
Online social networks such as Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn have an increasingly
important role in the spread of information through society. News about all kind of topics
can spread quickly along the “friend” or “follower” links in the network. Understanding
and modelling this process, and determining best strategies for reaching a large number
of users, is instrumental for commercial applications such as viral marketing, but also
for social activism and societal benefit, such as countering false rumours, spreading
information about safe health practices, etc.
Competitive Diffusion is a game-theoretic model for the diffusion of information in a
network which was introduced in [1]. This game is built on the assumption that there
are several players, who wish to spread competing information. One can think of compa-
nies wishing to encourage consumers to adopt their products, or political organizations
wishing to spread a point of view about a contentious issue. The goal of each player is
to reach the largest possible number of users. The messages spread by the players are
assumed to be competitive, so any user who adopts the view of one of the players will
not be susceptible to the messages sent by the other players. Moreover, users adopt the
view of the player whose message is the first to reach them. If two competing messages
reach the user at the same time, the user adopts a neutral position and effectively blocks
the passage of information.
Competitive diffusion lends itself to analysis via game theory. Because of the possi-
bilities that users turn “neutral”, it is not a zero-sum game. In this paper, we consider
the associated safe game. This game focusses on one particular player, here referred to
as Player 1, and the aim is to maximize the minimal gain of Player 1, regardless of the
strategies of the other players. The safe game can be interpreted as the game where all
other players have as their goal to minimize the gain of Player 1, rather than maximize
their own gain. The reason to adopt the safe game scenario is because the traditional
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2 JEANNETTE JANSSEN AND CELESTE VAUTOUR
game assumes full information about the strategies of the other player. The safe game
explores the scenario where the strategies of the other players are unknown, and thus the
safest scenario for Player 1 is to assume that the other players are actively countering
her strategy. This contrasts with the analysis of competitive diffusion in terms of pure
Nash equilibria, where the assumption is that everyone is fully aware of the strategies of
the other players, but the aim is for all players to maximize their own gain.
Our results concern the safe game of competitive diffusion played on trees. We give an
optimal safe strategy for full q-ary trees, and give asymptotically optimal safe strategies
for spiders. For spiders consisting of a number of paths of equal length joined at a
common vertex, we show that the safety value equals the gain of the disadvantaged player
in a Nash equilibrium for competitive diffusion. In other words, we cannot improve on the
safe gain by assuming the fully open and self-interested game rather than the adversarial
setting.
Finally, we use results for special types of trees to develop a heuristic algorithm that
can be applied to any tree. We show that the algorithm gives optimal results when
applied to certain subclasses of trees. We also test the algorithm on randomly generated
trees, and show that the safe strategies found by the algorithm have performance that
is close to optimal.
1.1. Related Work. The first studies on the spread of influence through social networks
assumed a passive model. The goal was to predict how information diffuses through a
network starting from a given set of vertices. If the information reaches a vertex, this
vertex is said to be activated. There are mainly two types of diffusion models, threshold
models and cascade models. The difference in these model is in how vertices become
activated.
In threshold models, vertices become activated once a variable associated with the
neighbourhood of a vertex surpasses a certain threshold. The most commonly used is
the Linear Threshold Model (see [7] and [9]). In this model, each vertex v has a threshold
θv, and a vertex v is influenced by each of its neighbours, w, by a weight bv,w. A vertex
becomes activated once the sum of the weights of its activated neighbours exceeds θv.
In cascade models, as a vertex becomes activated, it activates each of its neighbours
with a given probability. The most well-known is the Independent Cascade Model (see
[5] and [9]). In this model, we also start with an initial set of activated vertices. Here,
each edge vw is assigned a probability pv,w. If vertex v becomes activated, its neighbour
w will become activated in the next round with probability pv,w. The spread of influence
in competitive diffusion can be seen as a cascade model where the activation probability
equals 1.
The optimization problem studied in these diffusion models is how to choose the set
of starting vertices so that the expected diffusion is maximized (see [9], [3] and [15]). In
other words, the goal is to identify a set of initial influenced users which will bring a
greater overall influence throughout the network. A related approach is through Voronoi
games on graphs (see [21] and [2]). Here the players choose a set of vertices, and all
other vertices are assigned to the starting vertex which is closest to it.
Competitive diffusion, as proposed in [1], is the first game-theoretic model in which
the players are considered to be outside the social networks. Players choose initial users
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to influence and their goal is to reach the most users. In [1] (see also erratum [20]), the
authors discuss the relationship between the diameter of the graph and the existence of
pure Nash equilibria. A pure Nash equilibrium is a strategy which corresponds to a set
of initial vertices, whereas a mixed strategy represents a probabilistic approach where
starting vertices are chosen with a certain probability. In [19], the existence of a pure
Nash equilibrium for competitive diffusion on trees is shown, while in [16], results on
pure Nash equilibria are given for several classes of graphs. Moreover, [18] considers
the competitive diffusion on a recently proposed model for on-line social networks and
discusses the existence of Nash equilibria. The safe game for competitive diffusion was
introduced in [4], and some results for paths were given.
Generalizations of competitive diffusion were proposed in [6] and [22]. In [6], the
agents choose an allocation of budgeted seeds over the vertices and the diffusion process
is stochastic. In [22], the agents choose an initial set of vertices and the diffusion is a
threshold model.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Competitive Diffusion Model. Let us start by recalling the model Competitive
Diffusion from [1]. Let G be a graph with n vertices and suppose there are p players,
P1, ..., Pp each having a distinct assigned colour (not white or grey). The strategy of
each player is to choose a vertex in G as their starting vertex. The game begins by
colouring each of the starting vertices of the players and then proceeds with the diffusion
of colours through G as follows: at each wave of diffusion, a vertex that has one or
more neighbours with a certain colour inherits that colour while a vertex that has two
neighbours with different colors turns grey. The diffusion finishes when all the vertices
have either inherited a colour, have turned grey or are forced to stay uncoloured (white)
being blocked off by grey vertices. In the end, the gain of each players is the number of
vertices that has assumed his or her colour. The winner of the game is the player that
has the greatest gain. We note that if two or more players have the same starting vertex,
then this vertex immediately turns grey.
While the game can be played with any finite number of players, this paper concen-
trates on the two-player version of the game. In the following, the two players will be
called Player 1 (She) and Player 2 (He).
2.2. Mixed strategies. Consider competitive diffusion on an undirected graph G with
vertex set V (G) = {v1, v2, ..., vn}. We will denote the game matrix of Player 1 by AG.
Precisely, this is the matrix so that the entry (AG)ij gives Player 1’s gain if she chooses
starting vertex vi and Player 2 chooses starting vertex vj. A mixed strategy for a player
is a vector (x1, x2, ..., xn) so that
∑n
i=1 xi = 1 and xi ≥ 0 for i = 1, . . . , n. It should
be interpreted as a probabilistic strategy, where xi and yi is the probability the player
chooses vertex vi as starting vertex. Accordingly, the expected gain of Player 1 when
she plays the mixed strategy X = (x1, x2, ..., xn) and Player 2 plays the mixed strategy
Y = (y1, y2, ..., yn) is
Gain(G,X, Y ) = XAGY
T . (1)
Let Sn = {(z1, z2, ..., zn) | zi ≥ 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
∑n
i=1 zi = 1} be the strategy set of the
players. We will use the special notation Z(vk) for a mixed strategy equivalent to a pure
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strategy, i.e. when a player chooses vertex vk ∈ V (G) with probability 1 and the other
vertices with probability 0. Precisely, Z(vk) = (z1, z2, ..., zn) with
zi =
{
1 if i = k
0 otherwise.
(2)
2.3. Safe Game and Notations. The safe game for competitive diffusion is the zero-
sum game where the game matrix is AG, which is the game matrix for Player 1 in
competitive diffusion. The safety value for Player 1 is
value(AG) = min
Y ∈Sn
max
X∈Sn
XAGY
T = max
X∈Sn
min
Y ∈Sn
XAGY
T .
Moreover, if Gain(G,X∗, Y ∗) = value(AG), then X∗ is called the maxmin strategy for
Player 1, and Y ∗ is called the minmax strategy for Player 2.
Any (mixed) strategy for Player 1 in the safe game will be referred to as a safe
strategy. Correspondingly, any mixed strategy for Player 2 in the safe game will be
called an opposing strategy. In this paper, all strategies are assumed to refer to the safe
game, unless stated otherwise.
The guaranteed gain of Player 1 with the safe strategy X, GGain(G,X), is the minimal
gain that Player 1 could receive with the strategy X, i.e.
GGain(G,X) = min
Y ∈Sn
XAGY
T = min
y∈V (G)
Gain(G,X,Z(y)). (3)
The maximal gain of Player 1 against the opposing strategy Y of Player 2 is the maximal
gain that Player 1 could receive when Player 2 chooses the strategy Y , i.e.
MGain(G, Y ) = max
X∈Sn
XAGY
T = max
vi∈V (G)
Gain(G,Z(vi), Y ). (4)
Note that the guaranteed gain of Player 1 with any pure strategy Z(vk) equals zero,
since Player 2 can counter by playing the same strategy Z(vk), reducing the gain of
Player 1 to zero. Thus, any optimal safe strategy will be mixed.
The guaranteed gain with any safe strategy X for Player 1 is a lower bound on the
safety value while the maximal gain of Player 1 against any opposing strategy Y of
Player 2 is an upper bound on the safety value. Mathematically, we have
GGain(G,X) ≤ value(AG) ≤MGain(G, Y ). (5)
Thus, any pair of strategies for Player 1 and Player 2 give a lower and upper bound
on the safe gain value(AG). In the following sections, we find strategies so that these
bounds are tight or asymptotically tight.
2.4. Trees: Weights and Centroid. In this paper, we study the safe game for com-
petitive diffusion on trees. Here we introduce some facts about trees which are relevant
to our analysis.
There exists more than one notion of center in a graph. We use the“branch weight”
notion of centroid from [14]. A branch of a tree T at a vertex v is a maximal sub-tree of T
which has v as a leaf. Correspondingly, the weight of the vertex v, w(v), is the maximum
number of edges in any branch of v. We also use the notation w(v) = n−w(v), where n
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is the size of T . The centroid of T , denoted C(T ), is the set of vertices which have the
minimal weight in T .
In a tree, it is known that the centroid is either a single vertex or two adjacent vertices
[10]. Moreover, a tree which has only one vertex as centroid is called a centroidal tree
and a tree which has two vertices as centroid is called a bicentroidal tree. We also have
the following condition for a vertex to be in the centroid of a tree.
Theorem 1 (from [8]). Let T be a tree of size n with k branches having n1, n2, ..., nk
edges, respectively. Let v be a vertex of T . Vertex v is a centroid vertex of T if and only
if ni ≤ n2 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
The following lemmas on the weights of vertices will be helpful in establishing the
main results.
Lemma 2. For any tree T of size n, if v is a vertex of T not part of the centroid C(T ),
then its weight w(v) is the number of edges in the branch at v in which C(T ) is located.
Proof. By way of contradiction, suppose that B, the branch at v in which the centroid
is located, is not the branch with the maximum number of edges. Let c be a vertex in
the centroid. Since the weight of a vertex is the maximum number of edges in one of its
branches, we have w(c) ≥ n − |B|. On the other hand, since B is not the branch at v
with the maximum number of edges, we have w(v) ≤ n− |B|. Thus, n− |B| ≤ w(c) ≤
w(v) ≤ n − |B| since the centroid is the vertex with the minimal weight in T . Hence,
w(c) = w(v) which is a contradiction since v is not a vertex in the centroid of T . 
Lemma 3. For any tree T of size n, if v is a vertex of T not part of the centroid C(T ),
then
w(v) > w(v). (6)
Proof. If v is not a centroid vertex, at least one of its branches must have more than n
2
vertices by Theorem 1. Since w(v) is the number of edges in the largest branch at v, we
must have w(v) > n
2
. Thus w(v) > n− w(v). 
3. Spiders
We start the study of the two-player safe game of competitive diffusion by giving tight
bounds on the safety value for the game on special cases of trees, spiders and complete
trees. The corresponding safe strategies will give insight to suggest a good safe strategy
for a player on any tree.
A spider is a tree with one and only one vertex of degree exceeding 2. The vertex with
degree exceeding 2 is called the body of the spider. Moreover, any branch at the body
of the spider is none other than a non-trivial path and is called a leg of the spider. (See
[17]).
Let us denote the m legs of a spider S by {s1, s2, ..., sm} and their lengths respectively
by {l(s1), l(s2), ..., l(sm)}. We will label a vertex vi in S by an ordered pair (d, s) where
d is the number of edges from the vertex vi to the body of the spider and where s ∈
{1, 2, ...,m} is the index of the leg the vertex belongs to. By convention, the body of
the spider will be identified by the ordered pair (0, 0). We suggest the following safe
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strategy for Player 1 on a spider with legs of equal lengths. The strategy has positive
probabilities of choosing the body of the spider and the first k vertices of the legs.
Definition 4. Given a spider, S, with m legs each having ` vertices. Let the vertices
of S be labelled v0, v1, . . . , vm`, where v0 is the body of S, and for d ∈ {1, 2, ..., `} and
s ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}, the vertex vi where i = d + (s − 1)` is the vertex labelled by the
ordered pair (d, s). For any k ∈ {0, 1, ..., `}, define the strategy CS(k) to be the strategy
(z0, z1, z2, ..., zm`) as follows. Consider vertex vi with label (d, s). Then its probability
zi =
{
0 if k < d ≤ `,
1
mk+1
if 0 ≤ d ≤ k. (7)
Considering the strategy CS(k) as a safe strategy for Player 1 and as an opposing
strategy for Player 2 leads to the following bounds on the safety value.
Theorem 5. In the two-player Competitive Diffusion on S with m legs each having `
vertices, the safety value of Player 1 is between `−
√
`√
m
+O(1) and ` (asymptotics as `
goes to infinity).
Proof. Assume the vertices of the spider are labelled as in the statement of Definition 4,
that is, if vertex vj has label (d, s), then j = d+ (s− 1)`. As a lower bound, we have the
guaranteed gain of Player 1 with the strategy CS(k). As stated in (3), the guaranteed
gain is the minimal gain of Player 1 over all the possible starting vertices for Player 2.
Due to symmetry, we only need to consider the body of the spider and the vertices on
one of the legs of S. The expected gain of Player 1 when Player 2 chooses the body is
Gain(S,CS(k), Z(v0)) =
1
mk + 1
(
0 +m
k∑
δ=1
(
`−
⌊
δ
2
⌋))
.
Here, the summation is over the gain obtained when Player 1 chooses a vertex at distance
δ from the body. Evaluating the sum, we obtain
Gain(S,CS(k), Z(v0)) =

m
mk+1
(
k`− k2
4
)
if k is even
m
mk+1
(
k`− k2
4
+ 1
4
)
if k is odd.
If Player 2 chooses a vertex vj with label (d, s) where s > 0 and d > k the expected
gain of Player 1 is
Gain(S,CS1(k), Z(vj)) =
1
mk + 1
(⌊
1 + d
2
⌋
+ n− `− 1
+
k∑
δ=1
(⌊
δ + d− 1
2
⌋
+ n− `
)
+ (m− 1)
k∑
δ=1
(⌊−δ + d+ 1
2
⌋
+ n− `− 1
))
. (8)
Here, the first summation ranges over the gain obtained when Player 1 chooses a vertex
at distance δ from the body on the same branch as the starting vertex of Player 2, and
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the second summation does the same for a vertex on a different branch. The expression
above increases with d. Thus, the minimum expected gain for Player 1 occurs when
d = k + 1. However, the substitution d = k + 1 in (8) gives an expected gain which is
greater than Gain(S,CS(k), Z(v0)).
Finally, consider the case where Player 2 chooses a vertex vj with label (d, s) where
s > 0 and 0 < d ≤ k. Then the expected gain of Player 1 is
Gain(S,CS1(k), Z(vj)) =
1
mk + 1
(
d−1∑
δ=0
(⌊
δ + d− 1
2
⌋
+ n− `
)
+
k∑
δ=d+1
(
`−
⌊
δ + d
2
⌋)
+(m− 1)
(
d−1∑
δ=1
(⌊−δ + d+ 1
2
⌋
+ n− `− 1
)
+ `+
k∑
δ=d+1
(
`+
⌊−δ + d+ 1
2
⌋)))
.
In the above expression, the first line refers to the gain when Player 1 chooses a
starting vertex on the same branch as Player 2, while the second line refers to the
case where the starting vertices are on different branches. We can show that the ex-
pected gain in this case is greater than Gain(S,CS(k), Z(v0)). Thus, GGain(S,CS(k)) =
Gain(S,CS(k), Z(v0)).
Maximizing GGain(S,CS(k)) over k gives k
∗ = 2
√
`√
m
+ O(1) as the optimal integer
choice for k and GGain(S,CS(k
∗)) = `−
√
`√
m
+O(1).
For the upper bound, we have the maximal gain of Player 1 when Player 2 has the
strategy CS(k) with k = 0. If k = 0, the strategy of Player 2 is simply to choose the
body of the spider. In this case, the maximal gain Player 1 can obtain is `, the number
of vertices in one leg. 
4. Complete m-ary Trees
A complete m-ary tree (m ≥ 2) of height h, which we will denote by T (m,h), is a
rooted tree in which every internal vertex has exactly m children and all leaves have
depth h. The number of vertices in T (m,h) is n = m
h+1−1
m−1 . Let us identify a vertex vj by
an ordered pair (d, e), where d is the depth of vj, and e is the position of the vertex in
levels d if the vertices in the levels are numbered from left to right by {0, 1, 2, ...,md−1}.
By convention, the root of the tree will be identified by the ordered pair (0, 0).
In the following, we will use the notation Z(d, e) to denote the pure strategy Z(vj)
where vj has label (d, e).
We suggest the following safe strategy for Player 1 and opposing strategy for Player
2. The strategies have positive probabilities of choosing the root and the vertices in the
first level of T (m,h).
Definition 6. Let the strategy µ1 be a mixed strategy (x1, x2, ..., xn) on T (m,h) where
n = m
h+1−1
m−1 and for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
xi =

α1 =
mh−1
mh+2−mh+1+mh−1 if vi is the root,
β1 =
(m−1)mh
mh+2−mh+1+mh−1 if vi has depth 1,
0 if vi has depth d > 1.
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The probabilities α1 and β1 in the strategy µ1 were obtained by solving
Gain(T (m,h), X1, Z(0, 0)) = Gain(T (m,h), X1, Z(1, 1))
⇔ α1 · 0 +mβ1 ·
(
mh − 1
m− 1
)
= α1 ·mh + β1 · 0 + (m− 1)β1 ·
(
mh − 1
m− 1
)
,
(9)
subject to the condition that α1 +mβ2 = 1.
Definition 7. Let the strategy µ2 be a mixed strategy (y1, y2, ..., yn) on T (m,h) where
n = m
h+1−1
m−1 and for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
yi =

α2 =
(m−1)(mh+1−mh+1)
mh+2−mh+1+mh−1 if vi is the root,
β2 =
mh−1
mh+2−mh+1+mh−1 if vi has depth 1
0 if vi has depth d > 1.
The probabilities α2 and β2 in the strategy µ2 were obtained by solving
Gain(T (m,h), Z(0, 0), µ2) = Gain(T (m,h), Z(1, 1), µ2)
⇔ α2 · 0 +mβ2 ·mh = α2 ·
(
mh − 1
m− 1
)
+ β2 · 0 + (m− 1)β2
(
mh − 1
m− 1
)
, 3
(10)
subject to α2 + mβ2 = 1. In both these scenarios, it makes sense to equal the expected
gains since the players do not want the give an advantage to their opponent of choosing
a given vertex over another on which they assign a positive probability.
Considering the strategy µ1 as a safe strategy for Player 1 on T (m,h) and the strategy
µ2 as an opposing strategy for Player 2 on T (m,h) leads to the following result.
Theorem 8. In the two-player game of Competitive Diffusion on T (m,h), the safety
value of Player 1 is
(n− 1)((m− 1)n+ 1)
n(m2 −m+ 1) +m− 1
where n = m
h+1−1
m−1 . Moreover, Player 1 achieves the greatest gain with the safe strategy
µ1, and the best opposing strategy for Player 2 is strategy µ2.
Proof. As a lower bound, we have the guaranteed gain of Player 1 with the strategy µ1.
It is determined similarly as for the spiders, by taking the minimum gain for Player 1
over all pure opposing strategies Z(d, e) Due to symmetry, we only need to consider the
root of the tree and one vertex of each level as possible starting vertices for Player 2. By
(9) we have that
Gain(T (m,h), µ1, Z(0, 0)) = Gain(T (m,h), µ1, Z(1, e))
= α1 · 0 +mβ1
(
mh − 1
m− 1
)
=
mh+1(mh − 1)
mh+2 −mh+1 +mh − 1 . (11)
If 2 ≤ d ≤ h, the expected gain of Player 1 is greater than mh since
Gain(T (m,h), Z(0, 0), Z(d, e)) and Gain(T (m,h), Z(1, e′), Z(d, e)) for 0 < e′ ≤ m − 1
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and 0 ≤ e ≤ md−1 are both greater than mh. Moreover, mh is greater than (11). Thus,
GGain(T (m,h), µ1) = Gain(T (m,h), µ1, Z(0, 0)).
For the upper bound, we have the maximum gain of Player 1 when Player 2 chooses
the strategy µ2. It is determined by taking the maximum gain over all pure strategies
Z(d, e) for Player 1. By (10) we have that
Gain(T (m,h), Z(0, 0), µ2) = Gain(T (m,h), Z(1, e), µ2)
= α2 · 0 +mβ2 ·mh
=
mh+1(mh − 1)
mh+2 −mh+1 +mh − 1 .
Furthermore, for 2 ≤ d ≤ h,
Gain(T (m,h), Z(d, e), µ2) ≤ (α2 + β2)
(
mh−1 − 1
m− 1
)
+ (m− 1)β2
(
mh − 1
m− 1
)
.
Substituting the expressions for α2 and β2, we can show that this gain is smaller than
Gain(T (m,h), Z(0, 0), µ2). Thus, MGain(T (m,h), µ2) = Gain(T (m,h), Z(0, 0), µ2).
Finally, we have
GGain(T (m,h), µ1) = MGain(T (m,h), µ2) =
(n− 1)((m− 1)n+ 1)
n(m2 −m+ 1) +m− 1
since n = m
h+1−1
m−1 . 
5. An Algorithm to Find Safe Strategies for Trees in General
In this section we exploit our earlier results to develop a heuristic algorithm to find
a good safe strategy for any tree. We assume our tree to be centroidal. Such a tree
has the centroid as its root, and n − 1 vertices divided amongst a number of branches.
For bicentroidal trees, we can adopt a similar approach by considering one of the two
vertices of the centroid to be the root.
The branches extending from the centroid can have different configurations. In spi-
ders, all the branches at the centroid are non-trivial paths. We showed that a safe
strategy which chooses with positive probability vertices on the branches up to a certain
distance has a guaranteed gain near the safety value. On the other hand, the branches
in a complete tree are more clustered. We showed that a safe strategy which has a
guaranteed gain equal to the safety value only chooses the root and the first vertex of
each branch. This suggests considering different types of branches at the centroid and
defining accordingly a distribution of probabilities on the vertices in the branch.
5.1. Branches at the Centroid. We distinguish three different types of branches at
the centroid.
Definition 9. A thick branch at the centroid is a branch for which we have
w2 ≥ n− w1 + w
2
1
n
where w2 is the second lowest weight in the branch and w1 is the lowest weight in the
branch.
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A medium branch at the centroid is a branch for which we have
w2 < n− w1 + w
2
1
n
and w3 ≥ n− w2 + w
2
2 + (w2 − w1)2
n+ (w2 − w1)
where w3 is the third lowest weight in the branch, w2 is the second lowest weight in the
branch and w1 is the lowest weight in the branch.
A thin branch at the centroid is a branch for which we have
w2 < n− w1 + w
2
1
n
and w3 < n− w2 + w
2
2 + (w2 − w1)2
n+ (w2 − w1)
where w3 is the third lowest weight in the branch, w2 is the second lowest weight in the
branch and w1 is the lowest weight in the branch.
By considering that the weight of a vertex is the number of edges in the branch in
which lies the centroid (see Lemma 2), one can show that the vertex with the lowest
weight in a branch is adjacent to the centroid and that the vertex with the second lowest
weight is adjacent to the first. The next vertex with the lowest weight in the branch
could be adjacent to either of these vertices. However, condition (??) assures us that
the third vertex with the lowest weight in a thin branch is adjacent to the vertex with
the second lowest weight. It would be impossible to have condition (??) and the second
and third vertices with lowest weights on two different branches at the vertex with the
lowest weight, since this would imply n− 1 = w1 + (n− w2) + (n− w3).
Following an approach similar to that involved in finding the strategies µ1 and µ2, we
give an algorithm which, given any centroidal tree T of size n, assigns a distribution of
probabilities on the vertices of a branch which depends on the type of the branch. Let
Bi be a branch of T and let ui, ti and si be the vertices in Bi such that w(ui) ≤ w(ti) ≤
w(si) ≤ w(vk) for any other vertex vk in Bi. As explained in the previous paragraph, ui
is adjacent to the root, and ti is adjacent to ui. Vertex si could be adjacent to ui or ti,
but in case of a thin branch, si is adjacent to ti. The algorithm proposed here will assign
a probability α to the root (centroid), and, in each branch Bi, assigns probabilities βi,
γi and δi to the vertices ui, ti and si and probability zero to all other vertices in Bi.
The probabilities βi, γi and δi are given below. The expressions are given in terms of
the weights of vertices ui, ti and si and of α, the probability assigned to the root vertex.
The expression depends on whether the branch Bi is a thin, medium, or thick branch.
(i) If Bi is a thin branch,
βi =
(
w(ti)(w(ui)w(si) + (w(ti)− w(si))(w(ti)− w(ui)))
w(si)w(ui)w(ti) + w(si)w(ti)(w(si)− w(ti))
)
α
γi =
(
w(ti)
w(ti)
)
βi
δi =
(
w(si)
w(si)
)
γi +
(
w(ti)− w(ui)
w(si)
)
α
(12)
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(ii) If Bi is a medium branch,
βi =
(
w(ui)
w(ui)
)
α
γi =
(
w(ti)
w(ti)
)
βi
δi = 0
(13)
(iii) If Bi is a thick branch,
βi =
(
w(ui)
w(ui)
)
α
γi = 0
δi = 0
(14)
If Bi is a thin branch, the suggested probabilities were obtained by equalling the
expected gains of Player 1 when Player 2 chooses the centroid, the vertex ui, the vertex
ti and the vertex si and solving for βi, γi and δi knowing that α + βi + γi + δi = 1.
Similarly, the suggested probabilities if Bi is a medium branch were obtained by first
setting δi to zero, then equalling the expected gains of Player 1 when Player 2 chooses
the centroid, the vertex ui and the vertex ti. Finally, if Bi is a thick branch, we set γi
and δi to zero and we equal the expected gains of Player 1 when Player 2 chooses the
centroid and the vertex ui. The distribution of probabilities in the branches will be used
in the suggested safe strategy for Player 1.
5.2. Centroidal Safe Strategy (CSS) Algorithm. A centroidal tree can have diverse
proportions of thin, medium and thick branches. Moreover, unlike spiders and complete
trees, the number of vertices varies from branch to branch. Thus, some branches might
have very few vertices compared to other branches. Therefore, it would be unreasonable
to suggest a safe strategy for Player 1 which has positive probability of choosing vertices
in every branch at the centroid. As such, we define an algorithm to suggest a safe strategy
for Player 1. The algorithm starts by assigning positive probabilities to vertices on one
branch and then disperses probabilities on other branches as long as it is beneficial to
Player 1. To determine whether the assignment is beneficial, we define the criterion of a
branch. This criterion will be used in the algorithm to order the branches and determine
when the dispersion of probabilities on branches should stop.
Definition 10. For a branch B in a centroidal tree, we define the criterion of B, Cr(B),
as follows. If B has less than three vertices, Cr(B) = 0. Else, let u, t and s be the vertices
in B such that w(u) ≤ w(t) ≤ w(s) ≤ w(v) for any other vertex v in B, and u is a
neighbour of the centroid, t a neighbour of u, and s a neighbour of t or u. Then,
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Cr(B) =
w(u) if B is a thick branch,(
w(t)
n
)
w(u) +
(
w(t)
n
)
w(t) if B is a medium branch,
w(t)w(t)(n2−nw(s)−w(s)w(t)+w(t)2+2w(s)w(u)−w(t)w(u))
nw(t)w(s)+w(u)w(t)(−n+w(s)+w(t))+w(t)w(u)2 if B is a thin branch.
(15)
Algorithm 11. Centroidal Safe Strategy (CSS) Algorithm
INPUT: Centroidal tree, T , with d branches at the centroid.
STEP 1: Order the branches {B1, B2, ..., Bd} such that Cr(Bi) ≥ Cr(Bi+1) for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ d− 1.
STEP 2: Build a sequence of safe strategies σi for Player 1 by considering each
branch in order.
(a) If i = 0, form σ0, a strategy where the centroid is chosen with probability α.
(b) If i > 0, form, σi, a safe strategy in which the centroid is chosen with
probability α, the probabilities of choosing the vertices of the branches Bk,
1 ≤ k < i are the same in terms of α as in the strategy σi−1 and the
probabilities of choosing the vertices in the branch Bi are as given by (12),
if Bi is a thin branch, by (13), if Bi is a medium branch and by (14), if Bi
is a thick branch.
STEP 3: Determine α by solving α+
∑i
j=1 (βj + γj + δj) = 1 and calculate the
expected gain of Player 1 with the strategy σi when Player 2 chooses the centroid,
Gain(T, σi, Z(c)) = α · 0 +
i∑
j=1
(βj · w(uj) + γj · w(tj) + δj · w(tj)) . (16)
STEP 4:
(a) If i < d and Cr(Bi+1) ≥ Gain(T, σi, Z(c)) return to STEP 2 with i = i+ 1.
(b) If i < d and Cr(Bi+1) ≤ Gain(T (n), σi, Z(c)) or i = d, return the strategy
σi and the guaranteed gain, Gain(T, σi, Z(c)).
OUTPUT: Safe strategy for Player 1, σi, with guaranteed gain
GGain(T, σi) = Gain(T, σi, Z(c)). (17)
A few explanations on the algorithm are needed. In Step 4, we return to Step 2 to
disperse probabilities on another branch if Cr(Bi+1) ≥ Gain(T, σi, Z(c)). The criterion
being greater than the current expected gain results in an increase of the expected gain
of Player 1. Thus, the strategies σi give increased gain. This is shown in the following
lemma.
Lemma 12. In the CSS algorithm, if Cr(Bi+1) ≥ Gain(T, σi, Z(c)), then
Gain(T, σi, Z(c)) ≤ Gain(T, σi+1, Z(c)) ≤ Cr(Bi+1). (18)
Proof. Suppose Bi+1 is thick branch. If Bi+1 is a medium or thin branch, the proof is
similar. We refer here to the solved value of α in the strategy σi by α
(i), and let strategy
σi be represented by the vector α
(i)(x
(i)
1 , x
(i)
2 , ..., x
(i)
n ). Let vk be the index of the vertex
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ui+1 of Bi+1.To form the strategy σi+1, a probability of βj+1 =
(
w(ui+1)
w(ui+1)
)
α was assigned
to the vertex vk and we have a new solved value for α, α
(i+1). Moreover, we have the
following relation between the probability vectors.
x
(i+1)
j =
{
x
(i)
j if j 6= k
w(ui+1)
w(ui+1)
, if j = k,
and
1
α(i+1)
=
n∑
j=1
x
(i+1)
j =
1
α(i)
+
w(ui+1)
w(ui+1)
. (19)
If we compare the expressions for Gain(T, σi, Z(c)) and Gain(T, σi+1, Z(c)), we have
Gain(T, σi+1, Z(c)) =
n∑
j=1
α(i+1)x
(i+1)
j ·Gain(T, Z(vj), Z(c))
=
n∑
j=1,j 6=k
α(i+1)x
(i)
j Gain(T, Z(vj), Z(c))
+
(
w(ui+1)
w(ui+1)
)
α(i+1)Gain(T, Z(vk), Z(c)).
Now, x
(i)
k = 0, since initially, there were no positive probabilities on the vertices of the
branch Bi+1. Remembering that vk = ui+1, we obtain
Gain(T, σi+1, Z(c)) =
α(i+1)
α(i)
Gain(T, σi, Z(c))
+
(
w(ui+1)
w(ui+1)
)
α(i+1)Gain(T, Z(ui+1), Z(c))
= ν Gain(T, σi, Z(c)) + (1− ν)Gain(T, Z(ui+1), Z(c)),
(20)
where ν = α
(i+1)
α(i)
, and the last step uses (19).
From Step 4 of the algorithm, we know that, if the algorithm continues to form σi+1,
then Cr(Bi+1) ≥ Gain(T, σi, Z(c)). Since Bi+1 is a thick branch, Cr(Bi+1) = w(ui+1)
(see Definition 10). Recall from Lemma 2, that w(ui+1) is the number of edges in the
branch at ui+1 in which lies the centroid. Thus, there are w(ui+1) vertices in the branch
Bi+1 and so
Gain(T, Z(ui+1), Z(c)) = w(ui+1) = Cr(Bi+1) ≥ Gain(T, σi, Z(c)).
By (20), Gain(T, σi+1, Z(c)) is a convex combination of Gain(T, Z(ui+1), Z(c)) and
Gain(T, σi, Z(c)). Thus the inequalities stated in the lemma follow.

The lemma allows us to explain the ordering of the branches. After k loops in the
algorithm, suppose we have two branches at the centroid, Bi and Bj such that Cr(Bi) ≥
Cr(Bj) ≥ Gain(T, σk, Z(c)). By Lemma 12, we know that adding positive probabilities
on either of the branches Bi and Bj will increase the expected gain of Player 1. Moreover,
the resulting expected gains will not surpass Cr(Bi) and Cr(Bj) respectively. If we start
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by adding the probabilities on the branch Bj, the branch Bi remains a candidate to
increase the expected gain once more, since Cr(Bi) ≥ Cr(Bj). Let ν be the resulting
expected gain of Player 1 with the two branches added. On the other hand, if we start
with branch Bi, the resulting expected gain might or might not be lower than Cr(Bj).
If it is, we can add the branch Bj to get the expected gain ν. If it is not, then the
resulting expected gain with only the branch Bi is greater than ν. Thus, it is always
advantageous to include the branch with the largest criterion first. For this reason, we
order the branches in decreasing order of criterion in the algorithm.
Lastly, we must show that the minimal expected gain of Player 1 with the strategy σi
is in obtained when Player 2 chooses the centroid.
Theorem 13. Let T be a centroidal tree of size n with d branches at the centroid.
Suppose we apply the Safe Strategy Algorithm to T and we get the mixed strategy σk of
Player 1 as output. Then,
GGain(T, σk) = Gain(T, σk, Z(c))
where c is the centroid of T .
Proof. Suppose T has k1 thick branches, {iThk1 , iThk2 , ..., iThkk1 } ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., k}, k2 medium
branches, {iMed1 , iMed2 , ..., iMedk2 } ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., k} and k3 thin branches, {iThn1 , iThn2 , ..., iThnk3 }∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., k} from the set of branches {B1, B2, ..., Bk}, k1 + k2 + k3 = k.
Proving this theorem consists of determining the expected gain of Player 1 over all the
possible starting vertices for Player 2 and showing that the minimum occurs when Player
1 chooses the centroid. If Player 2 chooses to start with the centroid, the expected gain
of Player 1 with the strategy σk is
Gain(T, σk, Z(c)) = α · 0 +
iThkk1∑
j=iThk1
βj · w(uj) +
iMedk2∑
j=iMed1
(βj · w(uj) + γj · w(tj))
+
iThnk3∑
j=iThn1
(βj · w(uj) + γj · w(tj) + δj · w(tj)) .
(21)
The gain for all other pure strategies of Player 2 can be determined from the definitions
given earlier. The details of the proof are highly technical, and can be found in the
Appendix. 
6. Experimental Assessment of the CSS Algorithm
As a last section, we apply the CSS algorithm on some examples of centroidal trees
in order to evaluate its guaranteed gain. We generated random centroidal trees with
n = 100 and n = 1000 vertices. To evaluate the proximity of the guaranteed gain to
the safety value, we calculate its difference to the maximal gain of Player 1 against a
strategy for Player 2 which chooses with positive probabilities the centroid and some of
the vertices at distance 1 and 2 from the centroid. As explained in the first section, any
opposing strategy for Player 2 gives an upper bound on the safety value.
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Figure 1. Frequency of the differences between the guaranteed gain of
the CSS Algorithm and the maximal gain of Player 1 as a proportion of
the weight of the centroid in 1 000 random centroidal tree examples with
total number of vertices, n.
The trees were generated using Maple
TM
[11] and the computation of the CSS al-
gorithm was carried out using MATLAB R© [13]. The Maple
TM
function used for the
generation of the trees is RandomTree(n) which has a randomized process as follows:
“Starting with the empty undirected graph T on n vertices, edges are chosen uniformly
at random and inserted into T if they do do not create a cycle. This is repeated until T
has n−1 edges.” [12] Figure 1 shows the number of examples with a difference between
guaranteed gain obtained with the strategy given by the CSS algorithm, and the best
upper bound. The difference is given as a proportion of the weight of the centroid. The
columns represent the number of examples, out of a total of 1000, with a difference in
the intervals [0, 0], (0, 0.01], (0.01, 0.02],...,(0.29, 0.30] respectively.
We see that the algorithm performs well and even ideally on a number of examples.
A weaker performance was observed mostly for trees with large thin branches. This can
be explained from our result for spiders, where all branches are thin. For spiders, the
best strategy assigns positive probabilities to vertices at larger distance (about square
root of the length) from the root. The CSS algorithm limits the number of vertices with
positive probability in any branch to three. Thus, a trade-off of the versatility of the
CSS algorithm is that the performance on thin branches is not optimal.
7. Conclusion and Future Work
We have explored the safe game for competitive diffusion for trees. We obtained
precise results for special classes of trees, namely spiders and complete trees. These
results were then incorporated in the CSS algorithm, which can be applied to any tree.
This algorithm was evaluated experimentally, and was shown to give good results.
However, performance of the CSS algorithm decreased with the presence of many
thin branches. Generalizing the ideas presented here to include positive probabilities on
more vertices on the branches would improve the algorithm. One might also consider
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slightly modifying the ordering of the branches or the distribution of the probabilities to
compensate for the branches being considered isolated when the suggested distribution
of probabilities were calculated.
We believe that the ideas put forward in this paper can be extended beyond trees.
Namely, the spread of influence can be seen as taking place in the form of a subtree of
the graph. The general approach, of assigning positive probabilities only to relatively
few vertices close to the center of the graph, is likely to be of value here as well. Thus,
it seems plausable that the CSS Algorithm might be modified to a more general setting.
It may not be possible to obtain tight bounds for the safety value in the more general
setting, but it should be possible to generate safe strategies that perform well in practice.
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Appendix: Proof of Theorem 13
Proof. If Player 2 chooses to start with the centroid c, the expected gain of Player 1
with the strategy σk is as given earlier in (21). The labelling of the branches is as given
before (21)
Let us now consider the cases when Player 2 chooses a vertex in a thin branch, Br,
r ∈ {iThn1 , iThn2 , ..., iThnk3 }.
i) If Player 2 chooses to start with the vertex ur, the expected gain of Player 1 with
the strategy σk is
Gain(T, σk, Z(ur)) = α · w(ur) +
iThkk1∑
j=iThk1
βj · w(uj)
+
iMedk2∑
j=iMed1
(βj · w(uj) + γj · w(uj))
+ βr · 0 + γr · w(tr) + δr · w(sr)
+
iThnk2∑
j=iThn1 , j 6=r
(βj · w(uj) + γj · w(uj) + δj · w(tj)) .
(22)
For all j ∈ {1, 2, ..., k}, by definition we have that w(uj) < w(tj), and thus
w(uj) > w(tj). (23)
Also, by the definition of βr,
βr · w(ur) + δr · w(tr) = α · w(ur) + δr · w(sr). (24)
Using these, we can show that the expected gain (22) is greater than or equal to
Gain(T, σk, c) of (21).
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ii) If Player 2 chooses vertex tr, the expected gain of Player 1 is
Gain(T, σk, Z(tr)) = α · w(ur) +
iThkk1∑
j=iThk1
βj · w(ur)
+
iMedk2∑
j=iMed1
(βj · w(ur) + γj · w(uj))
+ βr · w(tr) + γr · 0 + δr · w(sr)
+
iThnk3∑
j=iThn1 , j 6=r
(βj · w(ur) + γj · w(uj) + δj · w(uj)) .
(25)
For all j ∈ {1, 2, ...k}, we have that
w(ur) > w(uj). (26)
IF j 6= r, this follows since the branch at ur in which the centroid is located
includes the edges in the branch in which uj is located. If j = r, we have the
result by Lemma 3. Moreover,
βr · w(tr) = γr · w(tr)
by the definition of γr. Thus, the expected gain (25) is greater than or equal to
Gain(T, σk, ur) of (21).
iii) If Player 2 chooses vertex sr, the expected gain of Player 1 is
Gain(T, σk, Z(sr)) = α · w(tr) +
iThkk1∑
j=iThk1
βj · w(ur)
+
iMedk2∑
j=iMed1
(βj · w(ur) + γj · w(ur))
+ βr · w(tr) + γr · w(sr) + δr · 0
+
iThnk3∑
j=iThn1 , j 6=r
(βj · w(ur) + γj · w(ur) + δj · w(uj)) .
This expected gain is greater than or equal to Gain(T, σk, tr) by (26) and since
α · w(ur) + δr · w(sr) = α · w(tr) + γ · w(sr)
by the definition of δr.
iv) If Player 2 chooses to start with a vertex vj, vj 6∈ {ur, tr, sr}, the payoff to Player
1 on all vertices not part of the branch Br can only increase since Player 2’s
starting vertex is at a greater distance. Specifically, the payoff to Player 1 on the
centroid is now at least w(ur). Moreover,
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- If vj is a descendant of ur but not of tr and sr then
Gain(T, Z(ur), Z(vj)) ≥ w(ur)
Gain(T, Z(tr), Z(vj)) ≥ w(tr)
Gain(T, Z(sr), Z(vj)) ≥ w(sr).
- If vj is a descendant of ur and tr but not of sr then
Gain(T, Z(ur), Z(vj)) ≥ w(ur)
Gain(T, Z(tr), Z(vj)) ≥ w(tr)
Gain(T, Z(sr), Z(vj)) ≥ w(sr).
- If vj is a descendant of ur, tr and sr, then
Gain(T, Z(ur), Z(vj)) ≥ w(ur)
Gain(T, Z(tr), Z(vj)) ≥ w(tr)
Gain(T, Z(sr), Z(vj)) ≥ w(sr).
Since w(v) > w(v) for any vertex v other than the centroid by Lemma 3, in all
cases we have
α ·Gain(T, Z(c), Z(vj)) + βr ·Gain(T, Z(ur), Z(vj))
+ γr ·Gain(T, Z(tr), Z(vj)) + δr ·Gain(T, Z(sr), Z(vj))
≥ α · w(ur) + βr · w(ur) + γr · w(tr) + δr · w(sr)
> α · w(ur) + γr · w(tr) + δr · w(sr)
= βr · w(ur) + γr · w(tr) + δr · w(tr),
where the last equality follows from (24). Now,
Gain(T, Z(c), Z(c)) = 0,
Gain(T, Z(ur), Z(c)) = w(ur),
Gain(T, Z(tr), Z(c)) = w(tr) and
Gain(T, Z(sr), Z(c)) = w(tr),
Thus,
βr · w(ur) + γr · w(tr) + δr · w(tr)
= α ·Gain(T, Z(c), Z(c)) + βr ·Gain(T, Z(ur), Z(c))
+ γr ·Gain(T, Z(tr), Z(c)) + δr ·Gain(T, Z(sr), Z(c)).
Therefore, the expected gain of Player 1 when Player 2 chooses the vertex vj is
greater than or equal to the expected gain of Player 1 when Player 2 chooses the
centroid.
Similarly, we can show that the expected gain of Player 1 when Player 2 chooses
to start with a vertex in a medium branch or thick branch, is greater than the
expected gain of Player 1 when Player 2 chooses to start with the centroid.
If Player 2 chooses a vertex in a branch Bi, i > k instead of the centroid,
Player 1’s payoff on the vertices in the branches {B1, B2, ..., Bk} can only increase.
Namely, in this case strategy σk assign no positive probabilities to any vertex in
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the branch. So, compared to the centroid, Player 2’s starting vertex is at a
greater distance from the vertices on which Player 1 has positive probability.
Player 1’s payoff on the centroid, being zero when Player 2 chooses the centroid,
also increases. Thus, the expected gain of Player 1 is again greater.
To sum up, the expected gain of Player 1 with the strategy σk is minimal when
Player 2 chooses the centroid. Thus, Gain(T, σk, Z(c)) is the guaranteed gain of
Player 1 with the strategy σk.

